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I.  INTRODUCTION
Your twelve-year-old microwave oven dies.  You want a high quality replacement with a revolving tray
that can hold a 10" plate and fit into a space 26" wide, 14" deep, and 13" high.  Unfortunately, the most
recent Consumer Reports analysis of microwaves is one year old, and none of the dozen models
reviewed strikes your fancy.  Searching the Internet drowns you with choices.  You wish it were possible
to consult someone with detailed knowledge of ALL microwave ovens for sale, who could quickly and
easily provide web addresses for the few models that best met your criteria and were rated highest by a
person or institution you respected.  To save hours of searching, you would even be willing to pay a
small fee.
The Internet gives online consumers unprecedented access to detailed information about
products for sale anywhere in the world.  This helps many buyers discover precisely what they
want and where to buy, often enabling them to purchase directly from providers (e.g., travelers
buying airline tickets from airlines).  Many consumers, however, overwhelmed by the multitude
of choices and abundance of data about those choices, still want assistance when shopping. They
seek a recommendation of their best choice or a short list of the most suitable options for further
consideration.
Shoppers unsure of which product best fits their needs may currently consult various types of
intermediaries (retailers, Consumer Reports, etc.) or online “infomediaries.”  In the Internet Age,
the most effective infomediary for this task is likely to be one that can help consumers craft
search profiles (based on their individual needs and desires) and apply them to a sufficiently
comprehensive database (containing detailed information about all the products in a market
segment).  Databases, like the real estate industry’s multiple-listing services (“MLSs”), offer
consumers access to a dramatically broader set of options than any traditional store or
salesperson’s memory could hold.  They also permit shoppers to sort these options according to
dozens, if not hundreds, of attributes.  Computers then enable buyers to transcend the
information processing capacities of humans by applying precisely designed personal profiles to
those databases and generating short, accurate lists of the best options.  The Internet then enables
3consumers to expand those lists into virtual high-tech catalogues of their choices by linking to
the Internet addresses depicting the items.
By enabling such databases to be shared globally, the Internet creates an environment
conducive to the emergence of selection assistants (“SAs”) that both compile relevant product
databases and help buyers design profiles for effectively searching them.  With detailed
descriptions of individual products already online, SAs can offer separate, “unbundled”
consulting services, without the need to finance or manage costly product displays and inventory.
Emerging forms of SAs create the potential for an environment approaching perfect information
and perfectly competitive markets.
While the marketplace is already providing consumers with a few versions of SAs, the
government should ensure that buyers have the opportunity to enjoy the full benefits of
competition and innovation that this technology offers.  The U.S. Commerce Department is
already attempting to identify regulations that may unnecessarily hinder e-commerce firms, but
policy analysts should also consider how to prevent the emergence of corporate practices likely
to stifle optimal competition and innovation.  To help public officials identify such potential
impediments to efficient e-business, this Article provides a draft framework for understanding
the dynamics of the product selection process in an Internet environment.  It then identifies three
categories of potential obstacles that may prevent full and effective competition.  Section III
examines those that may limit the breadth of choices consumers can consider.  Section IV
discusses those that may limit consumers’ ability to compare features of attractive alternatives.
Section V considers hindrances to consumer efforts to design the most effective search profiles.
This Article finds that many threats to a fully competitive cyberspace environment can be
handled effectively by the private sector, through adjustments to business strategies.
Accordingly, this mechanism should be favored unless it appears likely to be ineffective.  As one
example, this Article examines the complaints of eBay and the National Association of Realtors
(“NAR”) that competitors are free riding on the data that they have compiled and published to
attract buyers to their websites.  It observes that current laws provide eBay and other database
compilers with many opportunities to adopt strategies for earning significant returns on their
investments.  Moreover, this Article explains how the “database protection” law supported by
eBay, NAR, and many others might have diminished innovation and competition.  The Article
also identifies multiple strategies that valued evaluation services, like Consumer Reports, might
adopt to protect themselves against free riding.
Furthermore, this Article finds that improvements in information processing technologies
justify a reevaluation of regulations that limit competition out of fear that consumers may be
unqualified to make good choices.  Thus, as SAs permit the public to search effectively for
lawyers, doctors, etc., according to the particular skills desired, a shift from licensing restrictions
to voluntary certifications would seem likely to increase competition and substantially benefit
consumers.  This Article also observes that other potential problems seem most amenable to
voluntary industry trade association action or the entry of trusted third parties — remedies which
are generally preferable to government action.
This Article recognizes, however, that in many cases at least a limited government role is in
the public interest.  For example, where trade associations have set reasonable business
standards, they may welcome government enforcement efforts that prevent “bad apples” from
tarnishing the industry’s reputation.  When industries develop new products with confusing
features and competitors cannot agree on norms allowing easy comparisons by buyers,
government efforts to adopt recommended criteria for this purpose may be helpful to both buyers
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guidelines to avoid congestion on members’ website servers caused by price bots or “spiders,” a
problem that eBay has already taken to court.
In its role as public educator, it also seems appropriate for the government to help consumers
learn to use new information search tools for shopping as well as other purposes.  This Article
suggests that consumers should be advised about how to protect their ability to switch from one
SA to another without losing the chance to enable their new SA to provide customized selection
services based on their buying history.
The government should also clarify how existing antitrust laws against tying and denials of
access to an essential facility apply to database businesses.  The district court in United States v.
Microsoft has already recognized the difficulty of applying the rules against “tying” to new
information technologies.  This analysis may be particularly important if “network effects” lead
to the virtual monopolization of detailed product databases and multi-product collaborative
filtering databases.  Policymakers have also recognized that existing disclosure rules deserve to
be reevaluated in light of the emergence of new information technologies.
While policymakers usually wait for anticompetitive practices to arise before acting, a more
proactive strategy can be socially beneficial by anticipating and deterring harmful conduct and,
thus, avoiding less productive uses of resources.  Many scholars have embraced this approach,
recognizing that it is desirable to promote the most vigorously competitive and innovative e-
commerce environment possible.
II.  BACKGROUND
A.  The Internet Has Widened the Global Marketplace
The Internet is only the newest technology to increase consumer choices by expanding the
size of manufacturers’ markets.  Transportation technologies — including railroads, canals, and
trucks — first enabled consumers to purchase from distant merchants.  The postal service and
photographic technologies allowed consumers to view catalogue photographs of products that
were not displayed locally.  More recently, broadcast and cable television have allowed buyers to
view full-motion displays of distant products.  Now, the Internet makes it easy to view — on
demand — sophisticated product descriptions from firms throughout the world, with language
translation technologies eliminating yet another barrier.  Most manufacturers have concluded that
they cannot afford to ignore online shoppers.
Many consumers, long comfortable with making purchase decisions based on photographs
from the more than thirteen billion catalogues mailed annually, find the abundance and quality of
product information available on websites to be quite compelling.  Thus, increasing numbers of
consumers are willing to forgo in-person attention from salespeople, socializing with friends,
serendipitous adventures, and other desirable aspects of conventional shopping. Although
shoppers may prefer to stay offline when seeking a sensual item, such as a new perfume, food, or
a clothing texture, online shoppers are discovering that the Internet often offers an efficient way
to at least narrow down their options, if not also enjoy compelling online shopping experiences.
5B.  Shopping the Internet “Without” MiddlemenCan Be Frustrating
Shoppers can currently use Internet search engines to access manufacturers directly through
the World Wide Web by using the generic name of a product or some of its features.  Such
“disintermediated” searching, as predicted by some commentators, however, has many
drawbacks when a consumer has not yet selected the precise product to buy.  In particular, the
lists produced by search engines are generally both under- and over-inclusive.  This happens for
many reasons: not all suppliers presently maintain web sites; no single search engine appears to
cover even half of the “indexable web” (at least partly due to the time lag in listing them); many
sites are not labeled clearly (in some cases purposefully to deceive search engines); some sites
may be purposefully excluded for competitive reasons; and searches often yield so many
extraneous offerings that they overwhelm the user.  To paraphrase one forecaster of retailing
technology, “imagine looking for a blouse through a department store carrying nothing but
unsorted blouses from the basement to the top floor.”  The development of web page standards,
like eXtensible Markup Language (“XML”), and specialization of search engines and agents
should improve the ability of shoppers to retrieve web pages with the attributes they seek, but
searchers must still rely on the credibility of many different suppliers and ignore most data
generated by third parties.
Consumers may also use the Internet to solicit sellers directly.  They might post an electronic
want ad in a publication’s online edition or at a forum hosting “requests for proposals” (“RFPs”).
Websites, such as Autobytel.com, which allow buyers to seek the best deal for a previously-
selected product, can be very useful for finding the merchant with the best price.  Consumers can
also use sites like ValueStar.com, or Respond.com, which replace postings with e-mails to a list
of potentially relevant sellers.  If those hosting RFPs remain relatively passive, however, the
solicitations may attract numerous undesirable responses, particularly when the buyer seeks
subjective features, like a “charming” inn or an “authentic” autographed baseball.  While
ValueStar’s system of screening buyers may eliminate extraneous offerings, it also increases the
likelihood that the buyer will miss eager and qualified potential sellers who do not believe that
ValueStar’s annual “certification” fee is cost effective.
Two contrasting flaws handicap both search engines and forums for posting RFPs: they omit
some desired items and fail to exclude other undesirable ones.  These are the same twin failings
of even the best brick-and-mortar stores.  Some of the latter have tried to remedy over-
inclusiveness by providing consumers with “personal shoppers,” but the inherent space
constraints, which limit the number of displays stores can offer, are a more difficult problem.
Although personal shoppers could alleviate this restriction by using their knowledge of the entire
product market, most tend to confine their suggestions to the limited selections offered by their
employers.   Thus, shoppers seeking an optimal choice usually need to consult multiple stores,
search engines, or bulletin boards, and spend valuable time on frequently fruitless forays,
something few seem willing to do.  The problem faced by brick-and-mortar stores is that each
offering must either be included or excluded; there is no middle ground.
C.  What Shoppers Want and the Value of Databases
While consumers desire to identify their best option, most willingly settle for less-than-the-
best choices, a practice that has been called “satisficing.”  Often this is due to limitations on their
ability to store and process large amounts of information, their general reluctance to spend costly
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decline to consider greater numbers of relevant options, even though it would improve the
accuracy of their selection.  Instead, consumers generally construct preferences and strategies
heavily based on situational considerations, such as the limited effort they are willing to expend
on a search.  Consumers seek to maximize their satisfaction with the combination of their choice
and their decision process.  Shoppers then generally use a two-stage selection process.  First,
they use some strategy to narrow their options from all alternatives to a manageable
“consideration” set; then they devote greater efforts to select from that set.
Computers now provide consumers with a much more effective tool for storing and
processing product information.  They reduce the effort required to consider massive data, and
produce better selections, among other effects.  Moreover, given the overwhelming number of
choices and the diminished time consumers are willing to spend on shopping, the need for such
assistance is increasing.  As the CEO of Furniture.com observed, customers “don’t want a
football field of furniture. . . .  They want a boutique filled exclusively with the stuff they love.”
The best system would appear to be one that permits consumers to create a search profile based
on their preferences, apply it to the set of all worthwhile options, and generate a consideration set
of all of their best choices.
SAs can use databases to provide this service.  By permitting electronic entries to replace the
need for physical inventory, databases eliminate spatial limitations.  Databases make it practical
for SAs to offer buyers the opportunity to consider all possible options with searches that could
range across a virtually unlimited number of categories.  Furthermore, the electronic entries can
be carefully formatted in rows and columns to facilitate quick, easy, and accurate sorting and to
generate customized consideration sets of products.  Thus, databases have long been used in
“non-inventory” markets, including real estate, travel, and financial securities, and increasing
numbers of traditional retailers, such as Barnes and Noble, Borders, and outdoor goods merchant
REI, even permit customers to search online product databases from within their stores.
Meanwhile, the proliferation of entities offering credible performance evaluations —
strongly stimulated by the Internet — enables databases to store data according to those
formerly-more-difficult-to-search-by variables, which economists call “experience” and
“credence” qualities of goods.  Experience qualities, such as how funny a film is, are those which
generally require one to use a product before making an assessment.  Credence qualities, such as
how perceptive a doctor, lawyer, or repair shop is, are difficult to evaluate even after repeated
uses.
Brand names have long enabled manufacturers to communicate estimates of the experience
and credence qualities of their products.  Consumers can also judge experience and credence
qualities based on comments from friends and relatives.  Better yet, shoppers can rely on trusted
experts, such as Consumer Reports and any of the new Internet-based rating services, thereby
diminishing consumers’ need to rely on brands, which represent the judgments of inherently
biased manufacturers.  Although consumers appear unwilling to expend significant effort to
gather this data themselves, SAs can now monitor these evaluations and store them in an
accessible database format.
Currently, many consumers are willing to pay directly for buying guides like Consumer
Reports and Michelin tour books as well as other editing services, including those provided by
travel agents, interior decorators, or even summer camp consultants.  Buyers recognize the value
of improving the quality of their choices and reducing their search time.  They also realize that
informediaries generally serve the party that pays them.  Two factors, however, have hindered
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many firms have been providing forms of this service free of charge to build their business or
earn advertising revenues, while other individuals and groups have been doing so for other
reasons.  Against this background, consumers have been less inclined to pay even small amounts
for information that they have become accustomed to receiving free of charge.  This should
change, however, as free services become more cluttered with advertising or disappear in
bankruptcy or by starting to charge for their service.  SAs may also train consumers to pay small
amounts for advice by analogizing the payments to the cost of photocopying the information or
tipping a gofer.  In March 2001, Microsoft and Travelocity announced plans to adopt this
strategy of charging for these services.
Second, while consumers might still be willing to pay consultants anywhere from fifty cents
to a few dollars per transaction based on the incremental benefit of high quality information —
namely, better choices and decreased search time — relatively high billing costs may make it
uneconomic to bill for such small amounts.  This should change, however, as micro-payment
technologies improve and make it practical to bill on a less than dollar-per-minute basis or to
impose some other small surcharge.
III.  ENSURING ACCESS TO ALL DESIRED OPTIONS
Some online shopping assistants, including Shopper.cnet.com, have followed the brick-and-
mortar store model of only presenting products from which they can profit. Others, like
mySimon.com, however, have recognized the long-term value of all-inclusiveness.  They realize
that customers, particularly those with unusual preferences or those inclined to regret a missed
opportunity, are likely to be drawn to a site that enables them to consider all of the most suitable
options.  Thus, in the fall of 1998, Barnes & Noble boasted in advertisements that its 4.6 million-
plus-book database dwarfed the 3 million-book database offered by Amazon.com, and a website
planned for 2001 promises to permit travelers to view many times the number of flights that they
can now.  A wider breadth of options could also increase a website’s potential advertising
revenues.
A 1999 cover story in the Harvard Business Review calls SAs “navigators” and advises
companies to assume that role themselves, even if it requires recommending competitors’
products.  The article’s authors advise that, to retain customers’ trust and loyalty, firms must
demonstrate their willingness to serve the client’s best interests by navigating through all of
cyberspace and beyond.  The major airlines adopted this strategy when they voluntarily included
the flights of their competitors in their customer reservation systems.  Similarly, the retail
website proposed by General Motors will include non-GM cars, and “buyer” real estate agents
have realized that knowledgeable home buyers would value the chance to expand their options to
include the homes of sellers not offering to pay broker commissions.
Meanwhile, SAs should not find it too difficult to be comprehensive.  Those in retailing
already employ buyers to survey the Internet, trade shows, publications, and competing retailers
to select from the universe of offerings.  The cost to be comprehensive would only be the
incremental expense of carefully noting all items already discovered and reviewed by the
retailer’s buyer (including any rejected as inadequate for most consumers), which should
generally not be terribly burdensome.  SAs could also adopt the approach of EveryCD.com,
which offered free CDs to customers who identified titles missing from its database.  In addition,
established SAs could expect that manufacturers and other sellers would eagerly contact them to
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need to weed out discontinued products, and databases could even include items not “officially”
for sale anywhere.  If many SAs were to compete in a market, consumers might also desire a
“meta” SA to help them select among SAs.
A. Prohibiting Misleading Claims of Coverage
Consumer demand for a comprehensive database of product information would likely lead at
least one SA to provide it.  A problem arises, however, if SAs can mislead consumers about the
comprehensiveness of their databases.  While current advertising guidelines may discourage such
exaggerations, enforcement bodies might tolerate much looser uses of phrases like “all-
inclusive” and “comprehensive” as ordinary puffing, especially given the apparent impracticality
of monitoring all relevant options in a global product market.
Ideally, trade associations would help shoppers identify truly “all-inclusive” SAs by
formulating and publicizing reasonably precise and effective definitions of the multiple
variations of the term.  Alternatively, one would expect that consumer advocates like Consumer
Reports might step up to the task and designate a seal indicating that an SA offered
“comprehensive coverage,” relying on government assistance for preventing misleading claims
concerning these terms.  Absent that, a government agency might set reasonable criteria for such
a seal.  Meanwhile, comprehensive SAs could simultaneously offer shoppers filtered lists of
those items that met the SAs’ quality thresholds.
B.  Imposing Access Rules on Dominant Firms
Although some describe the e-commerce environment as a “frictionless” market, other
experts observe the danger of entry barriers.  In particular, the compilation of databases appears
to have some network effects along with other characteristics of natural monopolies.  Still,
whether SAs emerge with substantial market
power will depend on many factors with respect to both supply and demand.  On the supply side,
market power is more likely to arise in market segments where maintaining an accurate database
is more expensive.  On the demand side, it will depend on whether there are enough buyers to
support the cost of maintaining two or more databases.  In that vein, the development of more
user-friendly consumer interfaces, particularly voice recognition technologies, could
dramatically expand demand.  Some market segments could be winner-take-all markets,
although specialized market niches might arise and limit the market power of the dominant
generalist SA.
Even if SAs were likely to enjoy substantial market power, suppliers could be left to their
own devices to secure access to dominant SAs. The market pressures for full coverage, discussed
above, and fear of monopoly regulation might lead SAs to include the products of all suppliers,
while simultaneously offering a filtered version of “preferred” options.  On the other hand, past
refusals of media owners to grant access in other information industries, for economic and other
reasons, suggest that some types of access rules might be justified to regulate SAs.
In fact, the exclusionary actions of the publisher of the Official Airline Guide (“OAG”) led
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to bring suit to prevent the OAG from unfairly
excluding some airlines from the guide.  Comparable non-discriminatory “common carrier”
access rules have also been imposed on others with market power including telephone networks
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websites has led government agencies to investigate, and it appears to be one of the primary
reasons that British Airways created its own website.
While regulations that burden innovation by attempting to micro-manage could be
counterproductive, when SAs enjoy substantial market power, clear, general, pro-competitive,
“non-discrimination” access rules might be appropriate.  They  probably represent a more
efficient alternative to private lawsuits and non-expert courtrooms for resolving access rules in
this specialized area.  It might also be worthwhile to begin considering how to prevent database
operators with monopoly power from tying the use of their databases to other services.
C.  Combating Efforts to Deny Buyers Options
1.  Enabling Consumers to Employ Effective Aggregators
The emergence of “aggregators,” firms that offer consumers lists of options aggregated from
multiple primary sources, would appear to be in the public interest.  Yet at least some sources
have attempted to deny aggregators the right to use the information the former publish publicly.
For example, the National Association of Realtors (“NAR”) has fought efforts by Microsoft’s
HomeAdvisor.com to use NAR’s affiliate, Realtor.com, as a source for listings of homes for sale.
In addition, eBay fought efforts by both Auctionwatch and Bidder’s Edge to aggregate data
about the offerings of auction sites and even obtained an injunction preventing Bidder’s Edge
from repeatedly querying its website for auction listings when technical solutions did not work.
Some online retailers have made comparable efforts to block access by price-searching shopping
bots.
Many database compilers have focused their attention on Congress, where two bills were
introduced in the House in 1999 — H.R. 354 and H.R. 1858 — to protect database compilers
against unauthorized copying.  Those bills responded to a 1991 Supreme Court decision, which
clearly stated that the copyright law does not grant a party the right to prevent others from using
its collection of unoriginal factual data, simply because of the considerable “sweat” expended to
compile the information.  Current copyright law only protects the novel aspect of such a
presentation.
H.R. 1858 would have prohibited firms from copying data from a compiler and selling virtual
copies of it in competition with that compiler.  This prohibition would seem to have done little
harm to consumers, as the data affected is already generally available to them free of charge.
Meanwhile, the bill might have stimulated additional compilations of useful databases for
consumers — filled with the descriptive data discussed below — by preventing mere copiers
from siphoning away the attention of buyers and the associated advertising revenues.  Over the
long run, this might have improved consumer welfare.  H.R. 1858 also would have permited
third parties to mine existing databases to produce substantially enhanced databases, such as
those composed by aggregators.
H.R. 354 would have provided database owners with much stronger property rights to their
data.  In addition to prohibiting uses by pure copiers, H.R. 354 would have prohibited many uses
by true aggregators and others developing innovative, enhanced services.  In addition to concerns
about its constitutionality, H.R. 354 raises some major policy questions.  By preventing others
from using the data collected to build innovative and substantially enhanced databases to serve
consumers, it would have, to some extent, hindered the flow of publicly available information
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about competing products, which is necessary for a free market economic system to function
most effectively.  In addition, granting fact collectors strong intellectual property rights could
well discourage new innovations in providing access to those facts.
Scholars and policymakers recognize the advantages of limiting the intellectual property
rights provided by legislation.  Only when and if new technologies encourage conduct that
threatens the economic viability of valued existing or potential future enterprises would there
seem to be justification for modifying the associated property rights.  At present, however, this
does not appear to be the case with respect to factual data about products.  Absent congestion,
the current intellectual property laws, supplemented by legislation like H.R.1858, would seem to
provide sufficient incentives for the creation and use of an optimal level of databases.
Serving sellers.  Real estate brokers and eBay have the ability to obtain full compensation for
any valuable services they provide to sellers, including charging for advising sellers on how to
market their properties and for posting their information in an online database.  EBay can earn its
fees by providing a superior auction mechanism, in terms of rules and execution.  Additional
publicity via aggregators should help sellers and those earning commissions from a sale,
assuming that navigators do not create congestion problems.
Serving buyers.  To the extent that eBay wants to earn the advertising revenues from repeated
buyer visits to its website, it seems fair to expect it to offer the form of displays that buyers want.
If auction buyers, like travel agents, prefer one-stop aggregated lists of offerings in a category,
then, absent unreasonable congestion problems, they should be permitted to obtain them.
Accordingly, eBay should consider adopting an aggregator’s model by including data from
competing auction sites.  While this would eliminate one reason for sellers to use eBay and
might lead to the loss of some sales to competing auction sites, these effects did not stop eBay
from introducing a recommendation service for buyers.  Meanwhile, the emergence of
aggregators seems to be inevitable as well as in the public interest.  Both sellers and their
exclusive agents should want maximum exposure for their offerings to all bona fide potential
buyers and buyer agents, just as if the databases were catalogues.  Against this background, it
seems appropriate for policymakers to scrutinize Realtor.com’s “Golden Alliance” program
providing cash payments to MLSs for exclusive rights to post their listings, effectively
prohibiting the latter from providing listing data to competing national real estate websites.
2.  Licensing and Other Government Restraints on Choice
Customer choices are also limited by government policies, such as laws hindering consumers
from employing unlicensed providers of a service. For example, legal secretaries or paralegals
who clearly disclose their non-lawyer status, but offer to provide minimal legal assistance at a
low price, are prohibited from doing so without a professional license.  While there is no doubt
that consumers benefit from being able to identify which service providers or products have met
established quality standards, it is not clear that there is any benefit to denying them the option to
assume the risk of overriding those standards.  In fact, many critics claim that licensing laws are
designed primarily to protect the economic interests of members of professional groups rather
than the public; that unlicensed providers often provide comparable services; and that licensing
is generally bad public policy.  Regardless of whether any of these contentions are true, it is
important to recognize that the increasing availability of versions of SAs that are easily
accessible to the general public and user-friendly at least partially undermines the primary
justification for most types of licensing, even if other, more limited, rationales remain.
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Most licensing or other sales prohibitions appear to assume that consumers are unable to
protect themselves from unintentionally hiring unqualified individuals or using harmful products,
due to inadequate information, a lack of sophistication, or the presence of significant
misinformation.  This assumption is valid to the extent that the services offered by professionals
are difficult to assess prior to purchase because their primary attributes are the “experience” or
“credence” qualities discussed above, and such assessments are often made in periods of stress,
or that they are complex, multi-variable decisions.
Today, however, the selection process appears to be getting much more user friendly.
Professionals can and do secure certifications of many specialized skills, and there are many new
technologies for monitoring quality.  In addition, professionals are not shy about publicizing
their expertise and laws prohibiting such advertising have been set aside.  Furthermore, many
local media offer consumers comparative evaluations of professionals.  Against this background,
consumers will increasingly be able to use SAs armed with comprehensive databases to find
professionals meeting all of their requirements, as discussed below.  Once access to these SAs is
easy, it would seem that specialized certificates and disclosure requirements would be more
beneficial to society than absolute bans on practicing without a license.
Short of eliminating licensing requirements completely, states might at least consider
relaxing constraints on those who are licensed as professionals in another state.  Although states
may prefer to set their own minimum quality standards, and might be reluctant to see them
diminished by the lesser norms of other states, they should consider permitting their residents to
defer to another state’s credentialing as evaluated by an SA search focused on the individual’s
particular need.
IV.  FACILITATING THE SORTING OF OPTIONS
The burden of compiling and processing data about products often leads shoppers to make
choices based on less than full information.  SA databases, even better than charts, however, can
give consumers the opportunity to retrieve and display lists of products according to any set of
attributes that SA firms identify with labels.  This product data may be divided into three
categories.  Part A considers objective, inherent, often quantitative, static characteristics of
products and the conceptual categories into which they may fit.  Reliable data about these are
generally available directly from manufacturers.  Part B reviews attributes that measure
performance, including evaluations by experts and consumer surveys.  Part C discusses data that
relate tastes for a product with buyer preferences for other products.
A.  Objective Inherent Attributes
The Internet provides consumers and compilers of SAs with easy access to the detailed
product information now posted on manufacturers’ websites.  These include relatively well-
defined quantitative measurements of static qualities — such as sizes and ingredients — along
with any other relevant categories into which a product fits — such as “100% fat free,”
“unattached single-family home,” or “permanent press.”  These categories may be defined by
individual retailers, trade associations, the media, or interest groups.  Where the government
finds that private sector action is inadequate, possibly due to anticompetitive strategic actions, it
may adopt its own definitions of terms, such as the USDA’s definition of “orange juice.”
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As manufacturers recognize that SAs are creating databases of this information, their desire
to increase sales should lead them to provide it to SAs in the format requested.  Armed with such
data, many sites already permit customers to search for products based on their most significant,
objective, basic characteristics.  For example, AOL’s PersonaLogic.com permits consumers to
shop for a camcorder based on its weight, picture resolution, and recording time, and many sites
permit buyers to retrieve musical recordings that meet criteria, such as CD, jazz, saxophone, and
solo.  Collecting data embarrassing to sellers would require more effort, but where the societal
benefit from access to such information exceeds the cost of compiling and revealing it, it might
be desirable to require manufacturers to disclose such data.
To ensure the accuracy of their databases, SAs might periodically provide each manufacturer
with a printout of all the information compiled about its products so that producers could catch
unintentional errors or respond to negative information.  Moreover, if SAs refused to employ a
reasonable mechanism for correcting errors, it might be appropriate for the government to
consider such a requirement, along the lines of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, to protect small
businesses from dominant firms.
Manufacturers and SAs soon will also likely label products to help buyers find a gift that can
be “matched” to a recipient or an occasion being commemorated.  For example, if SA databases
label musical recordings with the composer’s birth date, location of the piece’s premiere, etc.,
buyers will be able to find CDs that not only match a recipient’s musical tastes, but also his or
her birth date (or at least birth year), hometown, honeymoon location, etc.  To increase sales,
manufacturers could also label products with any persons, places, or concepts with which they
could be connected by some relevant story, and SAs could supplement those lists or simply
confirm their accuracy.
Two sub-issues arise with respect to supplier disclosures of basic product information:  (1)
how to define terms and standards uniformly in a global market, and (2) how to revise existing
disclosure rules for a hypertext medium.
Before discussing these issues, it is important to acknowledge that this Article barely touches
on policy issues related to so-called “merchant” variables, such as price and availability,
although they are often critical to customer purchase decisions.  Although the integration of the
merchant selection process and the product selection process can and almost certainly will occur,
analysis of that combination is left for another day.  This Article simply assumes that the SA is
using either the data from a real-time merchant search or, more likely, a manufacturer’s
suggested retail price, in the manner of Consumer Reports or ActiveBuyersGuide.com.
1. Defining Terms and Standards in an Increasingly Global Environment
As just noted, it is usually rather easy for SAs to compile objective data about products in a
market.  Occasionally, however, it is unclear where a new product fits because the definitions of
categories are somewhat vague.  For example, should a SA characterize a Japanese version of the
South Korean pickled cabbage snack as “kimchi,” despite its differences with the South Korean
version, or should it tag a wristwatch as “water-resistant” based on its Swiss manufacturer’s
label?  Travelers and retailers of imported products have learned to adjust to the different
definitions that terms may have in different localities, but as more consumers enter the global
arena for the first time, they may be unaware of what problems to expect.  Additional action to
educate naïve new buyers may be warranted.
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Individual producers or an industry’s trade association, eager to encourage future sales,
should recognize the value of well-defined international terms and standards for each product
market and should act to help shoppers find what they are seeking.  Thus, when certain online
bookstores sought to deceive shopping bots seeking the lowest prices by hiding all of their profit
margins in their shipping costs, shopping bots quickly responded by redefining the price used for
ranking stores to include shipping and taxes.
Consumer groups or evaluation services may suggest useful standards and definitions, or
offer appropriate conversion tables between norms and definitions in different lands or beween
different companies’ sizes and colors.  In some cases, however, competitors’ conflicting views
may produce stalemates and an industry may be unable to settle on reasonable standards,
particularly in a global context.  Some firms may seek to exploit the standard-setting process to
frustrate competition.  In such cases, government involvement may be in the public interest.  For
example, the Department of Agriculture recently adopted highly praised standards for “organic”
food and the courts have enforced violations of the antitrust laws.  Where international
descriptive standards appeared desirable, industry and international bodies might adopt them.
When this proves impractical, government treaties like the one regulating the use of the term
“champagne” might be pursued, possibly through the United Nations.  Once standards were set,
government agencies could police the marketplace for false or misleading product claims.
2. Encouraging Appropriate Disclosure Rules for a Hypertext Medium
In addition to applying existing disclosure rules to cyberspace, the government could also
consider whether to take advantage of the Internet to adopt a more market-driven approach to
disclosure requirements.  Rather than imposing requirements — which could have inadvertent
negative effects on information flows — the government could focus on helping consumers to
demand the disclosures that intermediaries, like SAs, Better Business Bureaus, or the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) suggested.  Manufacturers would face market, not
government, pressure to reveal the data sought by intermediaries, including, for example, food
ingredients in a searchable form (for those with allergies) or in the seals of approval discussed
above, indicating that a respected intermediary was willing to verify some feature or condition.
The FTC has already recognized the value of such private-sector certification systems in the
context of industry privacy rules, and the CPSC has at times relied on existing industry
standards.  In addition, existing government educational efforts already promote this type of
educated shopping.
B.  Performance Assessments
Although product brands can often help consumers estimate a product’s long-term
performance, many shoppers also want to consider expert and fellow shoppers’ assessments of a
product’s performance.  At least two issues arise in this area: financing credible product
evaluations and the treatment of implicit endorsements.
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1.  Subjective Evaluations and Testing
Shoppers often solicit product evaluations from friends, family, and colleagues, but many
also seek aid from experts who gather or solicit large numbers of consumer evaluations or
conduct their own performance reviews.
a.  Gathering Volunteered Evaluations
Much information useful to shoppers is produced by third parties pursuing other goals.  For
example, school test results, high school graduation rates, and crime rate data that home buyers
(and thus real estate agents) may want is compiled by school districts and the police,
respectively.  New York City diners can consult a website listing cleanliness reports compiled by
the city’s restaurant inspectors.  There are many ongoing efforts to assess the quality of health
care plans according to statistically valid, quantitative data, and public health entities collect data
on medical success or error rates as well as adverse actions against physicians.  In addition, some
social activist groups  provide seals of approval for companies that meet their standards.
SAs already store data about products that have won or attained finalist status for prestigious
awards, with some book sites maintaining data about more than 50 different prizes.  SAs might
also quantify the wealth of quality assessments available from a variety of sources.  These
include negative comments, such as medical errors found by peer review groups, complaints
filed with Better Business Bureaus and state consumer protection offices or at websites created
by disgruntled customers, as well as both negative and positive comments posted at discussion
groups like alt.fashion, at manufacturers’ online communities, and at shopping sites like
Amazon.  Repair records could also be compiled more easily if uniform survey standards could
be developed.  SAs that could gather all this data, while screening out propaganda, would
provide useful assistance to buyers.  Ideally, an SA could quantify these overall quality
assessments according to a numerical scale to help consumers better sort products according to
these assessments.
b.  Financing Expert Evaluations and Consumer Surveys
Shoppers also value large, random samples of consumer reviews, and thus they buy Zagat’s
restaurant guides.  Similarly, manufacturers finance surveys by respected firms like J.D. Power
and ValueStar.com.  Then there are newcomers spawned by the Internet, like Epinions.com,
deja.com, and others that use multi-dimensional ratings.  These reviews and rating systems,
however, are susceptible to unconscious biases, rings of conspirators, and other factors that
diminish their credibility.
Therefore, buyers place even greater value on the evaluations of respected experts who test
or grade products themselves, such as Good Housekeeping and Consumer Reports.  In addition
to these institutions, consumers also rely on individual reviewers, other independent experts, and
“mavens.”  Because their credibility is essential to their role, these advisors attempt to resist
pressure from product producers.  Moreover, as wireless communications devices become more
prevalent, these experts may encourage instant customer feedback confirming their assessments
or suggesting that a reevaluation may be warranted.
SAs, like ConsumerSearch.com, can collect all scores published by value-rating services for
relevant product markets.  Manufacturers also have a strong incentive to provide SAs with all
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positive reviews of their products and perhaps even negative reviews about their competitors’
offerings.  SAs with special expertise in the product market may also add their own assessments
to their databases, as real estate agents often do.  Yet some observers have expressed concerns
that consumer product evaluation services would be undersupplied in the market if product
evaluators were unable to control the dissemination of their results.
As discussed above, the combination of databases and the Internet dramatically amplifies the
potential for free riding and may justify the additional protection offered by H.R. 1858 against
mere copying.  Although one can copyright subjective product evaluations, including even
estimated fair market prices, laws that prohibit them from being used as inputs to a private,
searchable database would appear to suffer the same infirmities as H.R. 354.  Meanwhile, it
appears that the marketplace already offers firms sufficient options for responding to this free
rider problem.
First, entities like Consumers Union could seek payment from other interested parties,
including the firms whose products they were evaluating.  Although Consumers Union might
reject this latter option for fear of damaging its credibility, it should be noted that auditors do not
lose their credibility when businesses pay them to verify financial records or privacy policies.  It
also seems clear that public broadcasters, as exemplified by The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, are
able to maintain their independence despite acceptance of grants or brand commercials from
parties on whom they report.  Although there is certainly a credibility problem for entities that
report on their owners or face other conflicts of interest, the key to keeping their reputations
intact appears to be careful disclosure of any conflicts that others may perceive.
Second, evaluators could refrain from publishing their empirical data.  They could offer their
customers the chance to sort among choices based on the raw data, but without actually seeing it
displayed, thereby relying on trade secret law to protect valued intellectual property.  Consumers
could search for products that were rated above average in a few specific categories or rated
highest in one category and above average in a few others, or any of a myriad of other
combinations.  Testers could also license the use of their raw data to others who agreed not to
display it.  As another option, product testers could provide or oversee testing for others, as Good
Housekeeping agreed to do for the website brandwise.com.
If neither of these incentives were sufficient, foundations might step in to fund the collection
of such data.  Academic research centers could also move into the breach to fund independent
evaluations, like the annual Airline Service Quality studies.  Alternatively, government funding
might be justified where a cost-benefit analysis indicated that the research was worthy, but the
“public good” aspects of the information, i.e., that it would be available freely to everyone,
would discourage the private sector from pursuing such studies.  Research on auto safety, toy
safety, airline on-time performance, or regarding food and medical practices would likely fall
into this category.  The Internet would also increase the justification for government funding of
product testing because information available online would be more accessible to the public.
c.  Specialization and Professional Certifications
Because some buyers may care solely about the product’s performance at one or two tasks,
rather than its overall rating, compilers of customer ratings generally grade different aspects of a
product or service separately.  For example, Zagat’s and deja.com provide separate ratings for a
restaurant’s food, atmosphere, and service, and CR rates many different relevant elements of
product performance in its charts.  Similarly, many respected retailers and magazines focus on
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one aspect of a product, e.g., “cutting edge” fashion or top-of-the-line performance for serious
cyclists or a specific niche of books.  Not only could SAs compile all of these specialized ratings,
but they could also translate the comments previous customers made in forums — on- or off-line
— into separate and distinct ratings for different uses.
In fact, most consumers seeking services from a professional are only concerned with the
supplier’s performance for that specialized task, rather than their skills outside that specialty.
SAs could serve consumers well by enabling them to focus on specific performance qualities and
documented expertise, while ignoring competency in less relevant areas.  For example, one
company has compiled a database of 400,000 people to help students find the best college for
attaining the specific lifestyle they seek.  Consumers could use the customized search profiles
discussed below to sort product or service options based on any combination of different
attributes.
2.  Reporting Implicit Endorsements
Consumers also rely on the implicit endorsements of respected stores, magazines, or
salespeople that sell, display, or use products without any explicit comment.  In fact, consumers
may often rely more on these retailer “brandings” than manufacturer brands.  SAs that label
products to show such implicit recommendations could give consumers the confidence to
consider new and lesser-known manufacturers’ products by labeling them with “icon” brands.
For example, SAs could label a restaurant as having a “Brooks Brothers” style or jewelry as
having a “Wired Magazine” style.  SAs might also label products with the names of well-known
and respected buyers that shoppers might want to imitate, for example, the linens used in the
Waldorf Astoria hotel and the desk chairs purchased by Goldman Sachs.  In addition, SAs could
include the choices made by celebrities, fictional characters, or anyone else that customers might
want to emulate.  For example, SAs could supplement labels to help shoppers retrieve the
lipstick worn by Monica Lewinsky on her 1999 20/20 interview with Barbara Walters and outfits
worn by a favorite character on a TV show.  Irrespective of the objections of celebrities, the First
Amendment appears to give SAs free reign to use facts about the products celebrities have
displayed in public.
The value that consumers place on a product may also depend not only on who else uses it,
but upon the number of other purchasers.  Some may prefer a product, like a “Harry Potter” book
or a book featured on Oprah, which they can discuss with many others.  Others may prefer more
exclusive goods.  To enable consumers to search by this attribute, SAs could add product sales
data to their databases.
For buyers seeking a gift, the most relevant evaluation is that of the recipient, and thus many
retailers have expanded their bridal registries to “any occasion” lists; meanwhile, companies like
WishList.com have established online versions.  Wives or husbands can aid their spouses with
gift ideas, and retailers and SAs alike might consider mining these sites for their data.
Current case law would appear to protect the right of SAs to collect and use data about
consumer shopping preferences, such as these online wish lists.  If customers with gift registries
desired greater privacy, then SAs could easily limit access by requiring a password to view gift
data.  Meanwhile, upscale stores could try to respond to free riding on their expert quality
assessments in at least two ways.  First, they might attempt to shift further toward private label
products.  Second, they could emphasize their comparative advantage in helping customers find
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the most suitable products by designing superior search profiles, as discussed in Section V
below.
C.  Collaborative Filtering Data: Implicit Features
In some cases, shoppers browsing for a product, like a book or CD, may be unable to
articulate some of the key attributes of what they are seeking, particularly the taste-based
“experience” qualities discussed above.  The relatively new and powerful process of
collaborative filtering (“CF”), however, is now permitting consumers to search for products
based on the implicit recommendations of others who appear to have very similar tastes.  CF
software solicits user preferences implicitly by asking users to rate previous and subsequent
purchases.  Then it identifies all other users in its database who exhibit similar preferences.
From this “similar tastes” group, it can retrieve ratings of a specified product or identify the item
rated highest by the group.  These recommendations appear more likely to predict what
consumers will like than even the expert critics whose tastes often differ from consumers’.
Similar systems might help consumers identify new products most likely to complement
products they already own.
CF has become more practical as technology has diminished the cost and difficulty of
collecting and processing consumer transactional data and rewarding respondents enough to
overcome their general apathy.  Moreover, CF database compilers are finding it more practical to
correct the error-prone presumptions of primitive algorithms — that all of a consumer’s
purchases represent his or her preferred choices — when consumers are disappointed with
purchases or when they have purchased items for others.  CF compilers are also starting to help
customers benefit from the use of both explicit and implicit data.  As developers experiment with
new varieties of CF systems and CF becomes increasingly more effective, network effects may
create a danger of monopolization and sabotage could also arise, as discussed below.
1.  Network Effects and Winner-Take-All Markets
Whether CF databases will become natural monopolies depends on many factors.  All other
things being equal, a CF database with more entries should produce better results than a smaller
one because it is more likely to include closer matches for any given customer.  The differences
may be insignificant, however, when the smaller database includes a large enough number of
individuals to produce excellent results.  Still, small differences may matter for major purchases
like a two-week vacation package.  Furthermore, as customers seek to match increasing numbers
of search criteria, the largest CF databases are likely to produce significantly more accurate
results.
Two factors suggest that consumers will seek matches on more criteria.  First, because
consumer tastes in different product markets are often related, CF databases should be more
effective when they combine data from multiple, potentially related product markets, including
restaurants, films, vacation spots, etc.  Moreover, to the extent that such correlations are
substantial but privacy rules prohibit firms from sharing data with other SAs, mergers and
consolidation might be undertaken to facilitate the creation of such multi-market transactional
databases.
This opportunity for aggregating such data undoubtedly motivated Amazon to offer to host
other retailers on its site and handle their transactions.  The infomediary firms proposed by Hagel
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and Singer would achieve similar results on the customer’s side.  Consumers’ satisfaction with
CF systems might well override any of their privacy concerns about data aggregation.  Second,
because consumers’ preferences are often significantly affected by their most recent purchases,
consumers might seek recommendations from only those who had made similar recent
purchases.
Many factors may also work against the emergence of natural monopolies.  Diseconomies of
scale and scope may make it impractical for a single entity to focus its resources on evaluating
too many different facets of each product choice.  If so, specialized databases might emerge to
focus on all of the variables most important to a target segment of customers, offering them
superior quality specialized service.  Network effects — and the creation of natural monopolies
— may also be limited by consumers’ desire to compartmentalize different aspects of their
purchasing decisions among multiple SAs to protect their privacy.
If quasi-natural monopolies do arise, antitrust laws will require policymakers to prevent firms
with market power from bundling their services to distort competition in related markets.  These
concerns about bundling services highlight the need for ways to distinguish among separate
product or service markets and to identify arrangements that represent illegal tying.  Although it
might not be in the public interest to treat the information in such databases as essential facilities
for other businesses, this issue may deserve further analysis.
2.  Sabotage of Collaborative Filtering Databases
As CF data becomes more and more useful to buyers and sellers, SAs may well compete
intensely based on the quality of their CF data and predictive algorithms.  Although there is no
way to ensure that all consumer entries included in a CF database are accurate, deterring the
intentional submission of false data would clearly be in the public interest.  Current tort laws
may already forbid such submissions as tortious interference with business interests, but it would
also probably be helpful for government bodies to help businesses spread the word that the
“pollution” of CF databases, by intentionally submitting false data, is prohibited by law.
D.  Managing Congestion
Whether or not eBay was likely to face congestion problems due to Bidder’s Edge and
others, congestion on the Internet is not a trivial problem.  Moreover, it will probably get worse
if consumers increasingly rely on shopping bots to make Internet price comparisons, leading
merchants to employ “pricebots” to adjust their prices based on the continuous monitoring of
their competitors.  If retailers felt forced to add additional capacity to ensure that bona fide
customers were not blocked from their sites, they would have a strong case for recovering their
additional capacity expenses from those parties causing the unwanted congestion.
It is not clear that tort law provides an efficient way for retailers to prevent such congestion.
In July 1996, a Best Buy store in Reston, Virginia had police remove an individual who was
copying down prices of its television sets, but a Fairfax judge quickly dismissed trespassing
charges without even considering whether the customer’s behavior had been disruptive.  Some
earlier cases, however, have gone the other way.  Nuisance laws might discourage congestive
practices, but leaving these issues to ad hoc decisions by judges does not appear to be the most
efficient alternative.
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Ideally, technology will solve the problem.  A solution may arise in response to the
comparable problem created by “spiders” and other web crawlers used by search engines to
index the web.  In the interim, firms may adopt new strategies for managing the problem.  EBay
already permits aggregators to search its website during off-peak hours and to do searches “on
demand” for buyers.  Firms might also create alternative URLs or listservers to provide price
changes or other information in an efficient manner for a fee.
Alternatively, trade associations and government agencies could try to formulate guidelines
to minimize congestion by setting a level of frequency of pricebot requests that would represent
prima facie evidence of a nuisance. Retailers who offered access to their freely available data on
reasonable terms should then be permitted to recover damages for harassment or nuisance from
those who congested their sites beyond the designated levels.
V.  DEFINING A BUYER’S SEARCH PROFILE
Some consumers already know the combination of attributes they are seeking in their desired
product.  Many others, however, are likely to desire assistance when trying to compile an
effective search profile, i.e., the characteristics on which to focus and how much weight to give
to each.  Most consumers have learned to adopt strategies and construct preferences to make
their searches manageable, if somewhat less accurate, rather than bucking the limits of their
information processing abilities to pursue their optimal choice.
One difficulty in designing precise search profiles is that it requires consumers to be clear
about what they want, including all of the conditions, goals, and aversions relevant to their
purchasing decisions.  Then they must translate these into precisely quantified preferences for
particular product features.  Given historical constraints on information processing, the
incremental benefits from such efforts are unclear, and consumers are rarely tempted to
undertake such a project.
SAs, however, can substantially improve the accuracy of consumer decision-making in two
ways.  First, computers have the information processing power to use a profile to evaluate each
and every option.  Second, SAs can offer consumers new and easier ways to construct optimal
search profiles that (1) eliminate all selections that fail to meet their minimum requirements, and
(2) rank acceptable options based on the intensity of shoppers’ preferences for relevant attributes.
Section A discusses the pursuit of these two goals in the absence of SA assistance, and Section B
discusses the new options that SAs can offer.  Section C analyzes some potential dangers to
competition in this area.
A.  Identifying Existing Conditions and Preferences
1.  Absolute Requirements
Although consumers generally “want it all,” most are willing to accept items that lack some
desired features or include some undesirable characteristics.  In fact, most shoppers expect to
make tradeoffs among their multiple preferences for product attributes.  Consumers, however,
usually have some absolute requirements, i.e., “non-compensable” preferences.  These may
include budgetary limits, timing deadlines, or spatial and geographic restrictions.  Additional
constraints may arise from strong consumer tastes, like an insistence on wearing only black
clothes or an abhorrence of country and western music.
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Consumers are usually aware of most of these absolute requirements before they consider a
purchase, but they may overlook or be unable to ascertain others, such as whether a new
purchase, like piece of computer software, is compatible with their relevant existing possessions.
In addition, shoppers may lack the expertise to recognize the significance of some conditions.
For example, a novice cyclist may be unaware of what features to demand or refuse when
purchasing a bicycle for a long trip through unusual terrain.
2.  Compensatory Preferences: Goals and Conditions
Selecting and weighting compensatory preferences for ranking a buyer’s acceptable choices
is a more difficult task.  To do this with precision, consumers would, at least in theory, need to
ascertain their “utility function” and translate it into a formula for evaluating each of their
options in a product market.  Compiling their utility function would generally require them to
articulate both their fundamental and derivative goals and the appropriate weights for each.
Constructing the latter product-specific formula would seem to require them to (a) identify each
of the attributes of the product that they find significant, (b) attach a subjective value to each
possible variation of that attribute, and (c) assign a weight to each feature based on its relative
importance.
This project would represent a impractical, if not impossible task.  Moreover, the inherent
subjectivity of this process is apparent from the controversy generated when magazines try to
rate the best colleges or cities.  Finally, additional complexity arises because many consumers
find variety and change pleasing, if not productive.  Therefore, their preferences for many
products are often significantly affected by their most recent purchases in the product area.
B.  Evaluating, Modifying, Anticipating,and Applying Preferences
Under these circumstances, even sophisticated shoppers may want assistance with the tasks
just discussed, particularly with measuring conditions, assessing the consistency and
consequences of their preferences, and understanding the details of a product market.  SAs can
help consumers by making it much easier for them to use much more accurate ranking systems,
like weighted adding.
1.  Prompts, Examinations, and Suggested Defaults
Most shoppers are likely to benefit from prompts, which anticipate responses with default
answers.  For example, doctors, real estate brokers, and investment advisors often give new
clients checklists of possible conditions and objectives to jog their memories for pertinent
information.  Moreover, improvements in voice recognition technologies should soon allow
these questions to be asked and answered orally, even by telephone, from remote locations and at
convenient times.  Alternatively, animated electronic agents may be able to handle this task,
particularly if they can make the small talk that builds customer trust.  In addition, expert
systems will be able to process answers to initial questions quickly enough to allow them to offer
anticipated default answers to later questions and automatically edit out inapplicable ones.
Moreover, questioning could reveal consumer preferences implicitly by asking consumers to
choose which of two options was better, in much the way that eye doctors establish a patient’s
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optimal lens features.  Many manufacturers’ websites already offer “configurators” to help
consumers create search profiles for seeking the best product matches on the website.
In many cases, consumers may also want an expert to observe and assess their condition.  For
example, they might desire a beauty consultant or tennis pro to examine their strengths and
weaknesses and recommend product attributes best suited for their needs.  Experts could assist
online shoppers by conducting remote examinations or by supervising self-examinations by
consumers.  For example, IC3D.com asks customers to measure the eleven specific body lengths
it uses to produce customized jeans.  To facilitate expert assessments, consumers may also
submit photos, create virtual models, or even undergo holographic body scans.
As indicated above, probably the most difficult task facing consumers is quantifying the
relative weights of different preferences.  Fortunately, new technologies can provide helpful
tools.  For example, to help federal government employees identify the best health care plan for
their needs, the Office of Personnel Management offers them use of PlanSmartChoice software,
which, in 2000, worked in four steps.  First, users were asked to select from a list the features
they considered most important.  Next, they were asked to consider how important it was to find
a choice that was rated highly with respect to each of those attributes.  Third, users were asked to
compare pairs of offerings and to quantify how strongly they favored one option over the other.
PlanSmartChoice software then used this consumer input to estimate weightings, generate
ratings, and rank the available plans.
A more promising alternative for managing this task is the opportunity that some SAs give
consumers to select a profile based on a few descriptive terms about themselves.  For example,
consumers shopping for a camera using software developed by companies like frictionless.com
can select the profile for a “budget buyer,” “beginner,” or “expert,” and use the set of default
preference weightings suggested by the SA for each.  In fact, SAs can construct profiles to reflect
every type of buyer imaginable, beginning with those represented by the hundreds of specialized
magazines and boutiques, i.e. brands, with which shoppers might identify.  By incorporating
demographic and lifestyle data, SAs can help consumers identify the best default profiles,
beginning with those based on their "VALS" lifestyles.
Furthermore, while both editors and retailers generally, at least implicitly, use profiles of
their target audience to produce only a single version of their presentation, a database medium
permits SAs to offer customers the opportunity to customize a version of that profile before
applying it to the data set.  That is, consumers could tinker with the default formula and modify it
to reflect their own idiosyncratic tastes.  Many online publishers already permit viewers to
design profiles to personalize displays on their web pages.  Databases could permit a woman
shopping for evening wear to customize her standard Bloomingdales profile to favor particular
fabrics or a specific fashion editor’s tastes.  Similarly, a student could modify the profile used by
a college guide to give different weights to specific academic departments or sports programs.
Consumers could give positive or negative weight to any features that SAs labeled in their
databases, including particular expert credentials.  Since a manufacturer’s brand generally
represents a specific set of features and qualities, consumers could also be offered a chance to
select variations on or combinations of the brands they liked.  Finally, SAs could offer shoppers
a third option — the opportunity to select a profile implicitly by using CF to generate
recommendations, as discussed above.
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2.  Reviewing and Evaluating Preferences and Conditions
Clever marketing practices that lead consumers to employ misleading theories may cause
buyers to adopt preferences that are inconsistent with their long-term goals or conditions.
Consumers may also confuse novelty with longer-term value, misestimate their needs, or fail to
give appropriate weight to relevant factors, or be induced to bias their decision making structure.
To help them avoid such unwanted consequences, shoppers may seek consultants to review
and interpret their purchase histories.  SAs might offer these services themselves or refer
consumers to experts, such as those listed on sites like ExpertCentral.com and EXP.com.  These
consultants could point out which of a consumer’s constraints or conditions were unnecessarily
eliminating potentially desirable choices and might easily be relaxed.  Consultants might also
help consumers reconcile conflicting goals or recommend training courses — for gaining the
prerequisite skills needed for some options — or psychotherapy, to eliminate destructive
preferences.  Consultants might also be helpful to those inclined to rely on CF, but who wanted
to shed undesirable preferences reflected in their past choices.  Since consumers are generally
reluctant to reveal data that might embarrass them, these consultants would first need to earn
their trust.
3.  Information About Features and Trends that Might Alter Preferences
Information about trends and predictions about future developments are also likely to affect
shopper preferences.  Just as car buyers adjust their purchase decisions to account for the annual
introduction of new car models, consumers might want to refrain from buying a type of computer
system in December if a new “breakthrough” version or a significant price cut was expected in
March.  Consumers might also want to consider the financial health of a product or service
provider when they expect to have future contacts with the provider and the industry is volatile.
In some cases, consumers might desire further information about a particular feature.  In
response, many comparative shopping services permit consumers, with a simple click, to display
detailed explanations of the feature or capability.  Some offer software programs, such as
Broderbund’s Cosmopolitan Fashion Makeover, to permit consumers to experiment with
offerings, while other online retailers, like Lands’ End and FurnitureFind.com, offer access to
live salespeople.  Still others have recognized the advantage of “brick-and-click” combinations
with conventional stores.
Shoppers can also refine their search profiles by browsing for ideas about what features to
favor or avoid.  Browsing can prompt them to remember forgotten or unconscious preferences or
to learn about new features.  For some consumers, browsing among pleasing options can be
comparable to sightseeing or visiting a museum.  For others, SAs and retailers can offer more
entertaining forums, including customized versions of interactive games, supported by ads or
user fees.  Furthermore, once consumers have adopted a profile and reviewed the recommended
items, they may want to alter their profiles to readjust the weights of some features.  This process
could go through multiple iterations.
Websites, such as ConsumerSearch.com, also include more general background information
and direct shoppers to reviews of a product category.  Many include postings of frequently asked
questions (“FAQs”) or forums for querying fellow shoppers.  Trade publications may offer more
expertise, but they may also be biased due to strong pressures from advertisers.  Consumers
could also consult independent entities, like Consumer Reports or a trusted author or government
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official.  These sources might also offer customers candid assessments of different expert rating
services, warning consumers about services with credibility problems, or recommending those
likely to use a target profile most like the buyer’s.
While retailers might try to offer free consultations as a marketing tactic, the increased use of
shopping bots could create conflict between the cost of providing expert consultations and the
need to maintain competitive prices.  While technology may help cut the telecommunications
expenses of such assistance, the costs of providing expertise may force retailers to unbundle and
charge separately for them, as doctors and cosmetics retailers often do.
C.  Eliminating Stickiness Due to Ignorance
The potential for higher profits encourages firms to improve the attractiveness of their
products or services so as to increase the likelihood that customers will remain with or repeatedly
return to them — known as “stickiness.”  It does not follow, however, that firms should be
rewarded for the higher “switching costs” that seem likely to result from consumers’ current
failure to appreciate the value of their purchase history data.  Rather, it is probably desirable for
the government to educate consumers about the value of maintaining control over their
transactional data as well as techniques for shopping online most effectively, thereby minimizing
their switching costs.
1.  Granting Consumers Control Over Their Data
As discussed above, data about past purchases is often crucial to enabling shoppers to search
most effectively, particularly with respect to collaborative filtering.  Nevertheless, consumers
often forget some of their explicit preferences or fail to discover implicit ones.  With computers
and databases making it easier to track purchases passively, many firms now compile such data
so that they may use it with CF to anticipate consumer choices and make recommendations.  In
fact, firms with multiple retailing channels are beginning to synchronize their catalog, store, and
website sales records, as well as other consumer data.  Firms are realizing that an excellent way
to create stickiness is to get customers to leave something of themselves behind.
Yet if consumers become enamored with the effectiveness of CF and refuse to give up its full
benefits, this may create a significant entry barrier for competitors, even those that might offer
superior CF algorithms.  While firms will presumably be willing to sell each customer his or her
data at some price, there would seem to be little incentive for those firms to limit their requests to
cost-justified prices.
Now consumers need not rely on their former CF providers to maintain that transactional
data.  Instead, they can use software products and infomediaries to collect it.  Meanwhile,
competition between these groups should ensure that such data collection services are available
at cost-based prices.  Yet this presumes full information, while most consumers today are
unaware of these alternative data collection mechanisms.  More importantly, most shoppers are
not yet familiar with CF, and even those who are may not fully appreciate how effectively CF
can help them to avoid bad choices.  Shoppers’ failure to foresee this value and respond
appropriately could lead current firms to gain an insurmountable early advantage over new
entrants with better offerings.
Nevertheless, many support a hands-off policy — permitting “first movers” to exploit any
monopoly they enjoy over data they collect — in the belief that increasing their reward will
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stimulate initial innovation.  On the other hand, permitting excessive advantages to accrue to the
first innovator might also hinder subsequent inventiveness in this area.  The European Union has
taken the opposite position, requiring all businesses collecting transactional data about a
customer to provide that data to the customer free of charge.  Yet absent the opportunity to earn a
return commensurate with the riskiness of their investments, data collection entrepreneurs might
well forgo investing in technologies to improve data collection.
One possible model for resolving the issue would be to follow the approach that American
law gives to patient medical records.  Although the law generally gives ownership of that data to
doctors, more than forty states have given patients either a statutory or common law right to
some type of access to their medical records, and many states limit the price that patients may be
charged for copies of those records.
Alternatively, to encourage the marketplace, rather than regulators, to set any prices or
specific procedures, public officials might simply use speeches and other public appearances and
writings to inform consumers of the value of their data and to recommend that they demand
disclosure of these terms and consider alternatives for maintaining copies of their own data.  The
government could include such advice in public service announcements and school lessons, and
public agencies might encourage trade associations to establish standards or to develop
technologies to facilitate the compatibility of data formats used by different firms.  Policy
makers might also consider a temporary disclosure requirement to give customers a frame of
reference on this issue.  If this policy was successful, consumers would demand such disclosures
before they chose a retailer, or at least before their existing retailer had collected too much data
about them.  Then market competition would lead retailers to offer shoppers their data at cost-
based prices, such as a flat rate or one based on the time period involved or the quantity of data
collected.
2.  Teaching Consumers to Use New Search Tools
Historically, children learned shopping skills by observing family and friends and by
studying arithmetic in school.  Today, however, with the emergence of databases and the
explosion in the number of product choices, the long-standing shopping skills of old are no
longer sufficient in the new Internet environment.  Retailers that help consumers become familiar
with navigating their websites will likely create significant switching costs beneficial to the
firms, but potentially harmful to consumers.  Therefore, public schools and adult education
centers should consider teaching students how to use these new tools most effectively.  Libraries
might also offer consumer education programs, possibly taught by volunteers from the
community.
The FTC has already published numerous electronic consumer and business guides, and with
the help of librarians and others — providing summaries of the best materials as well as links to
them — consumers could learn to become educated, demanding, and effective shoppers.
Educators could also teach consumers about the long-term benefits of embracing flexible, “open
access” search tools, which work on nearly all websites.
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3.  Unbundling Data Identification and Consultation
As discussed above, many traditional retailers help consumers compile search profiles free of
charge in return for expected purchases.  This makes sense when such assessments would be
difficult to sell as separate services and where consumers are relatively captive.  When there is
consumer demand for assistance in compiling a search profile as a separate service, such as
obtaining holographic body images to help customers shop more effectively for clothes online,
one would expect the marketplace to provide it.  If firms attempted to use bundling to extend
market power they held in one service market segment into another, then the current prohibition
against tying should be recognized as requiring unbundling to foster competition.
D.  Incentives for Developing Search Profile Templates
While SAs have the option of using existing trade secret laws to protect their proprietary
database entries, that option would not be available to SAs that offered shoppers the opportunity
to customize specially designed search profile templates; those SAs would need to reveal their
templates for consumers to use them.  Fortunately, it appears that existing copyright law would
protect SAs who develop creative and valuable search profiles.  Although the attributes they use
would not be copyrightable, the pattern of values and weights they employed would presumably
represent a novel variation of a search profile. While some entrepreneurs in this area may have
already sought patent protection for such profiles, it would seem inappropriate to grant any firm
a business method patent on a system that is already used implicitly by every business with a
target audience in mind.  Firms with reliable reputations that designed valuable search profile
templates could license them to others, but new entrants could still design their own variations
and improve upon the existing templates as products and consumer tastes evolved.
VI. EXAMINING INDIVIDUAL OPTIONS IN DETAIL:FREE RIDING AND RETAILER DISPLAYS
Once shoppers have used a profile to search all options and identify their most suitable
choices, they are likely to want to examine those items in more detail.  Furthermore, because the
adoption of a profile can be so imprecise, consumers may wish to view their choices and then
readjust their profiles several times before making a final decision.
Yet, it is not clear what role SAs will play as providers of product displays, given the
increased potential for free riding.  As online consumers are beginning to discover, a click or two
via a shopping bot like Deal Time, R U Sure, or any of the many listed at BotSpot.com can
transport them from the best online product displays to a trusted low-cost merchant. Some, like
dash.com, can even launch an automatic search for competitor prices whenever the user views a
product on a shopping site.  While one 1999 study found no evidence of significant free riding on
the Internet, that was probably because it takes time for consumers to become familiar with
reliable shopping bots.  Although some online retailers have sought to block access by shopping
bots, such efforts have not defeated the bots.  Moreover, most of the deterrents that protect
against free riding in the context of brick-and-mortar stores have dramatically weaker effects
with respect to online shopping.
Free riding on the Internet seems almost certain to increase as consumers find it easier to
exchange referrals to low-cost sellers, particularly for the many shoppers attracted to the Internet
primarily to obtain low prices.  E-mail already makes it simpler for buyers to use what has been
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called “word of mouse” or “viral marketing.”  If friends send a properly formatted website
address to those on their e-mail lists, recipients need only click on the address to reach the
recommended website.  Some consumers may spread the word for altruistic reasons, and retailers
can encourage recommendations by using the Amway formula of rewarding customers who
recruit new users.  Communication of this information will be even easier once voice recognition
technology software makes Internet communication — and shopping bot use — as consumer
friendly as voice telephony.
Retailers who create online product displays may respond to free riding by asking
manufacturers to reimburse their costs, as REI already has, but manufacturers are likely to
refuse.  Instead, manufacturers will probably find it more cost effective to finance a single, high
quality display of each item on their own websites, available to all online retailer customers via
hyperlinks.  These webpages might include 3D displays, like those already available at The
Sharper Image, other high-tech offerings, or even infomercials on demand.
If shoppers in traditional stores begin to use portable PCs to consult shopping bots for lower
prices, free riding at these stores could increase substantially.  This could lead manufacturers to
agree to compensate traditional retailers for their physical displays, then publicize retailer
addresses to online customers who want to make physical inspections.  Manufacturers could
even pay for traveling displays, in which they bring products to potential customers’ homes for
inspection.
VII.  CONCLUSION
Comparison shoppers, like all decisionmakers, seek two types of information: a short list of
their best options and detailed information about those choices.  The Internet now gives them
direct access to most of the detailed descriptions they need to make purchasing decisions, but
many consumers still seek assistance selecting the most suitable products.  Selection assistants
now have the technical capabilities to provide consumers with near-optimal service by (1)
compiling comprehensive, searchable databases with all of the attributes by which shoppers may
want to search; and (2) helping buyers effectively search these databases using carefully crafted
search profiles.  These services have the potential to improve the efficiency of consumer product
markets, benefitting consumers and the most valuable producers alike.  Policymakers should try
to maximize the benefits of market competition in this area by eliminating obstacles to
competition not likely to be overcome by other means.
